CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SOAP Box EXCEPTION TO THE
MIRANDA RULE: FIFrH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS SLIP DOWN
THE

DRAIN-New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).

Ever since the United States Supreme Court set forth its famous Miranda v. Arizona' decision, police have been prohibited
from questioning criminal suspects in custody without first informing them of their right to remain silent and to have an attorney present. 2 These warnings, which are based on the fifth
amendment, 3 were designed by the Court as a prophylactic measure to protect an individual from compelled self-incrimination
during custodial interrogation. Statements obtained in violation
of Miranda thus are not admissible as evidence. 4 In New York v.
Quarles5 the Supreme Court significantly departed from Miranda's
clear strictures by creating a "public safety" exception, which
permits police officers to interrogate suspects without giving the
Mirandawarnings when prompted by a concern for public safety. 6
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., a
young woman approached police officers Kraft and Scarring, who
were on road patrol in Queens, New York. 7 She told them that
she had just been raped, that her attacker was carrying a gun, and
that he had just entered a local supermarket. 8 Officer Kraft pursued the suspect, Quarles, into the supermarket while Officer
Scarring radioed for back-up. 9
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 444. The Miranda warnings specifically require that "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person ...
shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....

" The purpose of the fifth

amendment privilege is to protect an individual from being compelled to give testi-

mony that could subsequently be used against him at trial. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.

547 (1892).
4 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.

5 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (5-4 decision).
6 Id. at 2632. The "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule may be trig-

gered by circumstances posing a reasonable threat of danger to the police or public. Id. In the event the police are prompted by such a concern, they may conduct
custodial interrogations and dispense with Miranda warnings to the extent neces-

sary to neutralize the dangerous situation. Id. at 2632-33.
7 Id. at 2629.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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After briefly losing sight of Quarles in the supermarket, Officer Kraft found and subdued him in the rear of the store.' 0
When more than three officers had arrived at the scene, Officer
Kraft frisked him and discovered an empty shoulder holster."
Officer Kraft then handcuffed the suspect.' 2 Before informing
Quarles of his Miranda rights, Officer Kraft asked him, "Where is
the gun?"'" Quarles nodded toward a stack of soap cartons a few
feet away, and stated, "The gun is over there."' 4
Officer Kraft recovered a loaded revolver from one of the
cartons and placed Quarles under arrest.' 5 At that point, the officer read him his Miranda rights.' 6 Quarles then agreed to answer some questions without the presence of an attorney and
admitted that he owned the gun and had purchased it in Miami,
Florida. '"
Quarles subsequently was prosecuted for criminal possession of a weapon.' 8 The trial court excluded both his statement
pertaining to the location of the weapon, and the gun itself, because he had not first been warned of his right to remain silent.' 9
The judge also suppressed Quarles's other statements concerning ownership of the gun as evidence tainted by the officer's prior
1O Id. at 2629-30.
11 Id. at 2630.
Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. Interestingly, the dissent's portrayal of the events leading to the arrest
differed from that of the majority. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, asserted
that the majority had ignored the factual findings of the New York Court of Appeals
and characterized the majority's treatment of the facts as abusive. Id. at 2643 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Marshall maintained that as Officer Kraft
frisked Quarles, "the other officers trained their guns on the suspect." Id. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). According to the dissent, Quarles may
have been under greater duress and, therefore, intrinsically may have felt greater
compulsion to speak. See id. Indeed, Justice Marshall maintained that under the
facts of this case, there was no possibility that Quarles presented a threat of danger
to the police or public safety. Id. at 2643 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2630.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. Although Quarles initially was charged with rape, the record failed to state
why that charge was not pursued by the prosecution. Id. at 2630 n.2.
19 Id. at 2630. Nine months after Quarles was decided, the Supreme Court ruled,
in Oregon v. Elstad, that subsequent statements given after an initial violation of Miranda are admissible so long as there was no known coercion involved in the first
unwarned statement made by the defendant. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244, 4250 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1985). Therefore, had the Quarles decision been decided after Elstad,
Quarles's second statement concerning ownership of the gun would probably have
been admissible.
12
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failure to administer preinterrogation warnings. 20 The suppression order was affirmed by both the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York2 and the New York Court of Appeals.2 2 In its opinion, the court of appeals rejected the state's
claim that exigent circumstances existed and thus it found no basis for the officer's failure to provide the Miranda warnings. 2' The
United States Supreme Court reversed 24 and held that "overriding considerations of public safety" 25 justified an exception to the
rule that "Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers
may be admitted into evidence." ' 26 The Court thus concluded

that concern for "public safety" outweighs the prophylactic Miranda rules, which were designed to protect an individual's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 7
The privilege against self-incrimination was developed to
combat the inquisitorial methods of interrogation that were used
in England during the early seventeenth century. 28 Although in
England the privilege merely evolved into an unwritten rule of
evidence," in this country it was incorporated into the Bill of
Rights as part of the fifth amendment to the Constitution.3 0 Nev20 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.
21 People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981) (mem.), aff'd, 58
N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982), rev'd sub nom. New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
22 People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982),
rev'd sub nom. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
23 Id. at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
24 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.
25 Id. at 2629.
26 Id. at 2632. Because the Court found no Miranda violation, it concluded that
the statements obtained from Quarles after the administration of Miranda warnings
were not tainted. Id. at 2634. Additionally, the Court reasoned that its holding
made it unnecessary to address the state's argument that the gun was admissible
either because it inevitably would have been discovered or because it was non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 2634 n.9.
27 Id. at 2633.
28 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896). The Miranda Court observed,
however, that the privilege can be traced to much earlier origins, and noted that
" '[t]hirteenth century commentators found an analogue to the privilege grounded
in the Bible. To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared
guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.'" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459 n.27
(quoting Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code ofJewish Law), Book ofJudges, Law of

the Sanhedrin, ch. 18,

6, III

YALE JUDAICA SERIES

52-53).

See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896).
30 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459-60. The privilege against self-incrimination has
been recognized as a fundamental right. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 54445 (1897). The Miranda Court interpreted this privilege as a " 'right to a private
enclave where [an individual] may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
our democracy.'" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald,
29

688

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:685

ertheless, prior to 1897, the United States Supreme Court rarely
relied on the fifth amendment privilege in excluding a criminal
suspect's coerced confession."' Instead, the Court tested admissibility of confessions under prevailing common law rules of
evidence. 2
The first time the Supreme Court utilized the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to ban admission of a
confession occurred in 1897 in Bram v. United States.3 In Bram, a
case which involved the admissibility of a confession in Federal
court, the Court utilized a "voluntariness test" vis-a-vis the fifth
amendment in order to determine admissibility.3 4 Confessions
under that test were not admissible at trial if they were obtained
through forms of coercion, such as threats or promises of leniency. 5 Bram supplied the standard for assessing admissibility of
confessions in Federal courts 3 6 until it was supplanted by Rule
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires
an arresting officer to bring an arrestee, "without unnecessary
delay,"' 37 before the nearest available magistrate, and by the Mc233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (FrankJ., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957). For a discussion of the development of the law of confessions prior to
Miranda, see Developments in the Law--Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966).
31 Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). See generally Herman, The
Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 462-81
(1964) (discussing development of fifth amendment privilege as applied to police
interrogation).
32 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896); Pierce v. United
States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896) (same); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); cf.
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (suggesting that confession obtained
through threats loses its reliability and trustworthiness). See generally MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 147 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
33 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
34 Id. at 542-43. The Court stated:
The rule is not that in order to render a statement admissible the proof
must be adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a statement were voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to
establish that the making of the statement was voluntary; that is to say,
that from the causes, which the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused hope or fear in respect to the crime
charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled to make a statement, when but for the improper influences he would have remained
silent.
Id. at 549. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Federal
and state confession cases reviewed under a voluntary test. See generally Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 926-27 (1979).
35 See Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43, 558, 562-63; see also Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941) (asserting belief that promises induce false confessions).
36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
37 The McNabb-Mallory rule was a rule of statutory interpretation utilized by the
Supreme Court to exercise its supervisory power over the Federal courts. See Mi-
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Nabb-Mallory rule, which bars admission
of any confession ob38
tained in violation of Rule 5(a).

Similarly, prior to Miranda, in testing the admissibility of
confessions in state courts,
the Supreme Court employed the
"voluntariness" standard. 39 Because the fifth amendment was not
made applicable to the states until 1964,40 however, the Court
identified the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as
the constitutional
source for the state's voluntariness
41
requirement.
Under its due process analysis, the Court examined the totality of the circumstances under which a defendant's confession
was obtained and barred statements that it deemed to have been
coerced.42 Coerced statements were viewed as being inadmissible
randa, 384 U.S. at 463. The rule precluded the admissibility of confessions obtained when an arrestee was detained unnecessarily in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P.
5(a). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463 (citing Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)). Shortly after Miranda,
Congress passed legislation which substantially nullified the McNabb-Mallory rule.
See Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. II,
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1984)). But see Grano, supra
note 34, at 900 n.205 (suggesting that Act is unconstitutional "unless Miranda can
be considered a sublevel of constitutional law").
38 See United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 nn.3-5 (1951).
39 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936); see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (stating that Brown v. Mississippi was first state confession
case to apply voluntariness test under due process clause of fourteenth
amendment).
40 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
41 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). For a classic description of the due process voluntariness test see Culombe, 367 U.S. at 620-25; see
also Grano, supra note 34, at 929 n.358 (state voluntariness test similar to test applied in Federal cases). In the 30 years precedipg Miranda, the Court decided almost 40 state confession cases using a due process voluntariness analysis. See
Kamisar, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62, 102 & n.184 (1966).
42 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960). The factors the Court reviewed to determine whether a defendant's confession was given freely included: (1) length of interrogation, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); but cf. Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 395, 400
(1958) (although defendant was lassoed around neck on two occasions, Court determined confession was not induced by fear); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1953) (defendant confessed after two days of incommunicado detention, but Court
rejected claim of coercion because he attempted to negotiate terms under which he
would confess); (2) use of threats or physical abuse, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 529, 531 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564 (1958); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); (3) defendant's age and health, e.g., Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Blackburn v. Ala-
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not only because they lacked the fundamental requisites of trustworthiness and reliability, but also because of "the deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law." '4 3 The determinative question in each case was whether the
defendant's free choice or will was significantly impaired.4 4 The
voluntariness test, however, was criticized for affording defendants insufficient protection, and the Court was urged to abandon
it altogether.45
Dissatisfaction with the test led to a series of three cases that
were decided in 1964.46 In those cases, the Supreme Court reexamined the constitutional issues with respect to the procedural
standards of police interrogation practices and the admissibility
of confessions that were obtained thereby. 47 In attempting to rebama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant's insanity and incompetency rendered confession involuntary); (4) lack of education, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961) (mental incapacity coupled with illiteracy rendered confession inadmissible); (5) police tactics, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (trickery coupled with defendant's emotional instability led to involuntary confession); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
43 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); cf.Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 534-44 (1961) (discussing whether "behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about
confessions not freely self-determined"). See generally Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
44 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); see Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U.S. 737, 739 (1966).
45 Since the admissibility of a confession under the voluntariness test was determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court was unable to articulate precise guidelines. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L REV. 581, 598 (1979).
Consequently, trial judges were left with wide discretion, and decisions regarding
the voluntariness of a confession varied greatly. See id. at 598-99. See generally W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 263, 268-69 (1985) (discussing drawbacks of pre-Miranda voluntariness test); Kamisar, supra note 41, at 62, 94-104
(same).
46 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). One commentator has observed that:
Given the Court's inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition of "voluntariness," the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity of the concept to validate confessions of doubtful
constitutionality, and the resultant burden on its own workload, it
seemed inevitable that the Court would seek "some automatic device by
which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] be
controlled."
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, in 1977 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
102-03 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1977) (quoting S. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT
AND SOCIETY 10 (1967)).
47 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (sixth amendment right to
counsel barred admissibility of post-indictment confession obtained in absence of
counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against
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solve the coerced confession issue, the Court appeared to vascillate between utilizing a "new" fifth amendment voluntariness test
and employing an analysis based upon the sixth amendment right
to counsel.48
In Massiah v. United States,49 the Court held that the Federal
government violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel5" when Federal agents had "deliberately elicited" selfincriminating statements from him after his indictment and in the
absence of counsel. 5 ' In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court
determined that because the defendant's confession had been
given at a critical stage of the proceedings, he was entitled to the
assistance of counsel. 52 Thus, the Court did not consider absence
of counsel as a factor in a due process voluntariness analysis, but
rather it created a procedural safeguard against
self-incrimina53
tion, specifically on sixth amendment grounds.
Shortly after its decision in Massiah, the Supreme Court, in
Malloy v. Hogan,54 made the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination binding on the states through the fourteenth
amendment.55 In Malloy, the Court tested the admissibility of a
confession in a state criminal proceeding by the same "voluntaricompulsory self-incrimination applied to states through fourteenth amendment;
admissibility of confessions in state cases determined by same voluntariness standards that applied in Federal cases); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth
amendment right to counsel barred admissibility of pre-indictment confession obtained in absence of counsel).
48 Compare Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1964) with Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
49 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
50 The sixth amendment provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
51 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204-06. The Massiah Court recognized the need for
counsel when a person is interrogated after indictment, because questioning at this
stage is an integral part of the state's proceeding against him, Id; see Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also McLeod v. Ohio,
381 U.S. 356 (1965) (sixth amendment right to counsel made applicable in postindictment state confession cases).
52 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204-05 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327
(1959) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
53 Id. But see id. at 208-13 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that the
test for admissibility for confessions should continue to be governed under the voluntariness standard. Id. at 210 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White,
the Court had presented "no facts, no objective evidence, no reason to warrant
scrapping the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility in this area. Without such
evidence I would retain it in its present form." Id.
54 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
55 Id. at 6-8.
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ness" standard that applied in Federal prosecutions.5 6 Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, stated that the shift to the Federal standard in state cases "reflected [a] recognition [by the
Court] that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege is
57
its essential mainstay."

One week after Malloy was decided, the Court held in Escobedo v. Illinois58 that the sixth amendment right to counsel also
barred confessions made by a defendant during preindictment
interrogation without the presence of an attorney. 59 In Escobedo,
the defendant was arrested on suspicion of murder.60 During the
course of a fifteen-hour interrogation, the police denied the defendant's repeated requests to consult with his lawyer. 6 ' Moreover, the police actually encouraged the defendant to make a
statement without advising him of his right to remain silent.62
In determining that preindictment interrogation was a critical stage in criminal proceedings, the Court reasoned that "no
meaningful distinction [could be] drawn between an interrogation of an accused before and after formal indictment.- 6' The
Court found that because police suspicion had focused on Escobedo and the police were attempting to elicit a confession from
him, an adversarial situation had arisen and the defendant's need
56

Id.

57 Id. at 7. For a brief historical perspective on the applicability of the fifth

amendment to police station interrogation, see Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 466 n.95 (1964).
58 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
59 Id. at 490-91.
60 Id. at 482.
61 Id. at 480-82.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 486. The Court stated that to make the right to counsel depend on
whether the defendant had been formally indicted "would exalt form over substance." Id. Justice Stewart, who authored Massiah, saw a significant distinction between that case and Escobedo in that once there was an indictment formal judicial
proceedings began against the defendant, resulting in an end to the general investigation and the start of adversarial proceedings. Consequently, in Massiah the defendant was entitled to constitutional safeguards. Id. at 493-94 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Preindictment questioning, in Justice Stewart's view, did not trigger
formal judicial proceedings but only represented routine police investigation of an
unsolved crime. Therefore, constitutional safeguards under the sixth amendment
should not have been invoked in Escobedo. Id.; see also id. at 496-98 (White, J., dissenting) (admissibility of defendant's confession should have been governed under
fifth amendment to determine if it was voluntarily given; sixth amendment was inappropriate since formal judicial proceedings had not begun). For a brief discussion tracing Justice Stewart's sixth amendment philosophy, see Grano, supra note
34, at 941 n.430.
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for counsel was crucial." The Escobedo Court thus avoided a totality of the circumstances analysis and instead relied on the sixth
amendment right to counsel to exclude a coerced confession.
Unfortunately, these three decisions added to the confusion
and uncertainty over which amendment and what procedures
protected an individual against coerced, self-incriminating statements.6 5 In 1966, this confusion was substantially dispelled by
the Miranda decision.6 6
In an opinion authored by ChiefJustice Warren, the Miranda
Court reaffirmed the fifth amendment as the constitutional
Massiah, 378 U.S. at 486.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 ("[Escobedo] has been the subject ofjudicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state
and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions."); Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2646 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (prior to Miranda,
there existed "considerable confusion over whether the Sixth Amendment or the
Fifth Amendment provided the basis for [the] prohibition [against coerced self-incriminating statements]"); cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 402 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (prime purpose of Escobedo was not to uphold sixth amendment right to counsel but to protect
defendant's fifth amendment privilege).
Because Miranda only applies to cases tried after its date, the precise meaning
of Escobedo still retains a degree of importance. SeeJohnson v. NewJersey, 384 U.S.
719, 732 (1966) (Escobedo and Miranda should not be applied retroactively). Voluntariness still governs pre-Miranda cases. See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519,
521 (1968); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966). Additionally, the
right-to-counsel cases maintain their importance because they can be relied on to
exclude incriminating statements not necessarily inadmissible under Miranda. See,
e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
66 Miranda involved four consolidated cases in which the defendants in each case
were sequestered in a police station - "cut off from the outside world" - and
questioned either by the police or a prosecuting attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 45657, 491-99.
Specifically, in Miranda, the petitioner Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his
home and then taken to a Phoenix, Arizona police station for interrogation. Id. at
491. After two hours of police questioning, Miranda signed a written confession.
Id. at 491-92. Additionally, a paragraph was typed above this confession which
stated "that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of
immunity and 'with full knowledge of [his] legal rights, understanding [that] any
statement [he made] may be used against him.' " Id. at 492. Over the objection of
his lawyers, Miranda's written confession along with other oral statements he made
were introduced at his trial. Id.
Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape and sentenced to 20-30 years
imprisonment on each count. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision, relying heavily on "the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel." Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that Miranda's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violated. Id.
Although the Court overturned his convictions because he had not been informed
of his rights, Miranda was later retried and found guilty of rape and sentenced to a
maximum of 30 years in an Arizona prison. Thomas, Court at the Crossroads, TiME
MAG., Oct. 8, 1984, at 33. Ironically, in 1972 Miranda was paroled, and, in 1976, he
was stabbed to death in a Phoenix bar. Id.
64
65
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source that protected an individual against being compelled to
make self-incriminating statements during custodial interrogation. 67 In rendering its decision, the Court implied that the traditional standards of voluntariness used in determining
admissibility of confessions did not adequately safeguard an individual's fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.6 8 To dispel the confusion that arose from
application of the nebulous voluntariness test, ChiefJustice Warren both defined the circumstances that triggered that constitutional privilege69 and formulated procedural guidelines to be
used by police during custodial interrogations.70
The Miranda Court observed that the process of in-custody
interrogation generated "inherently compelling pressures,"
which effectively overcame a person's will and compelled him to
speak. 71 Accordingly, the Court created a presumption that statements made by a defendant, in the absence of full warnings of his
constitutional rights, were coerced, 72 and hence, inadmissible because they violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 73 In effect, Miranda strongly suggested a per se test
for excluding compelled, self-incriminating statements:7 4 failure
either to inform the accused of his constitutional rights 7 5 or to

obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver from him prior to in-custody questioning could destroy the admissibility of any such
76
statements at trial.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
See id. at 457.
Id. at 444-45, 467-69, 478-79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the criticism of the voluntariness test.
70 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. See supra note 2 for a recitation of the warnings
which must be administered to a defendant prior to any custodial interrogation.
71 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court observed that "compelling pressures"
are limited not only to physical coercion but also to psychological coercion. Id. at
448.
72 Id. at 467. The Court stated that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." Id.
at 458.
73 Id. at 444. Significantly, Miranda safeguards were applicable to all custodial
interrogations, even if they had taken place outside the police station house.
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477).
74 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 461.
75 See id. at 478-79.
76 Id. at 444, 467, 475-76. The Court declared that a waiver will not be presumed from the defendant's silence. Id. at 475. Statements obtained in violation of
Miranda, however, may be used for impeachment purposes, provided they are voluntarily given. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (voluntary statement
obtained in violation of Miranda was admissible for impeachment purposes). But see
67
68
69
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By requiring police to administer warnings before commencing custodial interrogation, Miranda clearly established procedural safeguards to protect a defendant's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination." The decision, however,
failed to delineate satisfactorily what constituted either "custody" or "interrogation" for purposes of triggering those warnThus, post-Miranda cases focused on factual
ings.
determinations of custody and interrogation in order to ascertain
whether the right to Miranda warnings had attached.7 8
In 1969, in Orozco v. Texas, 79 the Court extended the Miranda
rule to all custodial interrogations, including those taking place
outside the police station.8 0 In that case, police officers had questioned the petitioner in his room, without giving him any Miranda
warnings. 8 The state of Texas argued that because the questioning had taken place in familiar surroundings, the petitioner was
not "in custody" and thus Miranda was inapposite.8 2 According
to the Court, the site of the interrogation was not the focal point
for determining whether someone was "in custody" for purposes
of triggering application of Miranda.83 Rather, it asserted, the
central edict of Miranda was that warnings had to be given whenever the suspect being interrogated was " 'deprived of his freedom . . . in any significant way,' " regardless of the place of
interrogation.8 4
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the question of
what constituted custodial interrogation in the 1980 case of Rhode
Island v. Innis.8 5 The defendant in Innis was picked up by police
for allegedly shooting a taxicab driver with a sawed-off shot
gun. 86 After advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, the police transported him in a squad car to a police station.8 7 While
traveling in the car, the defendant made several incriminating
statements after one officer, in conversation with another, reMincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (coerced statements obtained in violation
of Miranda held not admissible for impeachment purposes).
77 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-69.
78 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324 (1969).
79 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
80 Id. at 326-27.
81 Id. at 325-26.
82 Id. at 326.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 327 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477).
85 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
86 Id. at 293-94.
87 Id. at 294.
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marked that some children in a nearby school for the handi88
capped might be injured if they were to discover the gun.
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, determined that the Miranda safeguards were applicable "whenever a person in custody
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. '89 The Innis Court, therefore, concluded that express
questioning or its "functional equivalent" constituted
interrogation. 90
Until 1984, the Miranda warnings were triggered automatically when a suspect came under custodial interrogation.9 ' In
Quarles, the Supreme Court departed from the principles that
were enunciated in Miranda and held that police officers may dispense with Miranda warnings when "overriding considerations of
public safety" are at stake.92 The "public safety" exception created by the Court permits police to interrogate a suspect before
giving Miranda warnings where there is an imminent threat of
danger to either the police or the public.9 3
To support the Court's creation of a "public safety" exception, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,9 4 asserted that
Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights per se, but rather
they are merely procedural safeguards to protect the right
against compulsory self-incrimination. 95 He also noted that the
88

Id. at 294-95.

89 Id. at 300-01.
90 Id. Therefore, interrogation under Miranda applies not only to express ques-

tioning, "but also to any words or actions on the part of the police . . .that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect." Id. at 301. These measures were designed to provide a suspect with
added protection "against coercive police practices, without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of the police." Id. Nevertheless, the Innis Court held
that the defendant's statements were admissible at trial because the police officers
had no reason to know that their conversation would elicit self-incriminating statements from the defendant. Id. at 301-02.
91 See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("[I]n Quarles, the majority has abandoned the [Miranda] rule that brought eighteen years of doctrinal
tranquility to the field of custodial interrogations.").
92 Id. at 2629. The Court concluded "that [Quarles] present[ed] a situation
where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda." Id. at 2630.
93 See id. at 2632.
94 Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
White, Blackmun, and Powell.
95 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631. Recognizing that there has been an exception for
"exigencies" under the fourth amendment, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a similar exception should be available under the fifth amendment. Id. at 2630 n.3. But cf
id. at 2648 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Fourth Amendment . . .should
have no analogy in the Fifth Amendment context.").
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fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination does not
apply to all incriminating statements but only to those which actually are coerced.96
Ignoring the constitutional presumption created in Miranda
that statements obtained in violation of Miranda are compelled 9 7 - the majority pointed out that Quarles made no claim
that his statements actually were coerced by the police or that his
will was overborne.98 The Court thus rejected Quarles's argument that statements made without Miranda warnings are presumptively compelled. 99 The majority concluded that the only
issue to be determined was whether the officer was justified in
failing to administer the warnings to Quarles. 100
While it acknowledged that the lower courts had made no
factual finding that exigent circumstances had existed, the majority concluded that a "public safety" exception to Miranda nevertheless was justified. 10 ' Because police officers in "kaleidoscopic
situations" often act on myriad unverifiable motives, such as their
own safety, the public's safety, and their desire to obtain evidence, 0 2 the Court insisted that availability of the exception
10 3
should not depend upon the officer's subjective motives.
The Quarles Court next considered the social cost that its
newly created exception imposes upon the public.'O° Justice
Rehnquist viewed the Miranda rules as acceptable protections of
the fifth amendment privilege where fewer convictions of guilty
suspects is the only resultant cost to society.' 0 5 The majority,
however, was unwilling to require that Miranda's procedural safeguards be invoked to protect an individual's fifth amendment
privilege at the expense of public safety.' 0 6 In the Court's view,
96 Id. at 2631.
97 See id. at 2647 (Marshall,J., dissenting). The Miranda Court asserted that, absent preinterrogation warnings, the constitutional presumption of coercion operates independently of the particular facts in each case. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 46869.
98 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631.
99 Id. at 2631 n.5.
100 Id. at 2631.
101 Id. at 2631-32.
102 Id. The Court maintained that the application of the public safety exception
"should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer." Id.
103 Id. at 2632.
104 See id.
105 Id.

106

Id.
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such a cost would be too great for society to bear. 10 7 Maintaining
that in exigent circumstances the need for answers to questions
outweighs the need for the prophylactic Miranda rule, the Court
concluded that police officers should not be forced to choose between preserving potential evidence and protecting the public
from potential danger.'" 8
The Court acknowledged that to some extent the "public
safety" exception to the Miranda rule diminishes the rule's clarity,' 09 but it postulated that "public safety" is more important.l1
The majority maintained, however, that a "workable rule" is necessary in order to minimize the need for police officers to balance
"the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.""' Justice Rehnquist further asserted
that the exception will not be difficult for police to administer. 112
Reasoning that each case will be "circumscribed" by the exigency
immediately facing the police, the Court opined that officers can
"distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to
secure.

. .

the safety of the public and questions designed solely

to elicit testimonial evidence.""' 3 The Court therefore determined that allowing officers "to follow their legitimate instincts,"
would simplify police procedures during on-the-scene investiga107 See id. Justice Rehnquist maintained that a recitation of Miranda warnings may
have deterred Quarles from responding to police questioning, which would have
resulted in a potential threat to public safety. Id. The majority noted that had Officer Kraft first given Miranda warnings to Quarles, the suspect may have not confessed to the location of the gun. Id. Therefore, according to the Court, Officer
Kraft needed Quarles's answer not only to make a case against him, but more importantly, to protect the public from danger; an accomplice, customer, or store
employee might discover and use the gun. Id. But see id. at 2642-43 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent maintained that because the area in the store was deserted
at the time Quarles was apprehended, and because the police could have cordoned
off that area, it was highly unlikely that other persons would have found the gun. Id.
108 Id. at 2633.
109 Id.
110 See id.
''' Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. Justice Rehnquist believed that the facts of the case demonstrated the ability of police officers to accurately apply the exception. See id. He maintained that
Officer Kraft asked only as many questions as were necessary to secure the public's
safety. Id. The majority noted that once the gun was retrieved and the danger to
the public dispelled, the officer read the defendant his Miranda warnings before
continuing with his investigation. Id. It is interesting to note that ChiefJustice Burger, who joined in the majority's opinion in Quarles, had previously insisted just
four years earlier in Innis that "[flew, if any, police officers are competent to make
the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated." Innis, 446 U.S. at 305 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
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tions where public safety was imperiled.' 1 4
Justice O'Connor joined in the part of the Court's opinion
that admitted the gun into evidence," 5 but she dissented from
the Court's reversal of the suppression of Quarles's initial statement concerning the gun's location." 6 She explained that she
might have joined the majority's full opinion if it was writing on a
"clean slate.""' 7 She asserted, however, that "Miranda is now the
law," and opined that the Court had not provided "sufficient justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear strictures. '" 8 Insisting that the public safety exception will create
confusion, Justice O'Connor cautioned that "[t]he end result will
be a finespun new doctrine on public safety exigencies . . . complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that currently plague our
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence.""'
Justice O'Connor further believed that in creating the exception, the majority had misconstrued the critical issue that had
114 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633. The majority attempted to distinguish Quarles
from Orozco, which had involved similar facts. See id. at 2633 n.8. The Quarles Court
noted that in Orozco, unlike Quarles,
the questions about the gun were clearly investigatory; they did not in
any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or
the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon. In
short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by the officers
beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.
Id.
115 Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor's reason for finding the gun admissible differed from the majority's. See
id. Injustice O'Connor's view, the gun was nontestimonial evidence. Id. Maintaining that "nothing in Miranda or the [fifth amendment] privilege itself requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial interrogation,"
id.,Justice O'Connor insisted that a defendant may be compelled to relinquish such
evidence against himself. Id. at 2637 (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion analyzing Justice O'Conner's view of the gun as nontestimonial evidence, see The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 143 &
n.21, 148 n.51 (1984).
116 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2637 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
117 Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3145 (1984) (principal advantage of Miranda
doctrine is its clarity). In Quarles, Justice O'Connor pointed out that Justice Rehnquist had previously referred to the rigidity of the Miranda rule as its " 'core virtue' " because " '[i]t ... afforded police and courts clear guidance on the manner
in which to conduct a custodial interrogation.' " Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2636
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fare v. Michael
C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers on application for
stay)).
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been addressed by the Miranda Court. 2 0 The Miranda decision,
she explained, has never prevented police from interrogating
suspects in order to secure the public safety. 12' In her view, Miranda requires only that when incriminating statements are elicited in the absence of preinterrogation warnings, the act of
protecting the public be borne by the state, rather than the defendant. 122 That result, she maintained, was found by the Miin the fifth
randa Court to be implicit, "for better or worse,"
23
self-incrimination.1
against
amendment privilege
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority for discarding the procedural safeguards that were clearly set
forth in Miranda.124 He felt that by creating an exception to Miranda the majority had endorsed admissibility at trial of coerced
statements in direct contravention of the "Court's longstanding
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment."' 2 5 The dissent further
criticized the majority for distorting the facts before it in order to
justify creation of an exception to Miranda.126 Justice Marshall
disputed the majority's characterization of the facts surrounding
Quarles's arrest as posing a threat to public safety. 12 7 He maintained that the majority's focus on objective facts - rather than
on the subjective perceptions of the arresting officers - to measure a public danger was merely a "ploy."'1 28 To support that
view, Justice Marshall observed that on the same facts the New
no exigent circumstances
York Court of Appeals concluded that129
had presented a danger to the public.
in
Justice Marshall next questioned the majority's wisdom 130
progeny.
its
and
Miranda
of
strictures
clear
departing from the
According to the dissent, Miranda had "the virtue of informing
120 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
121
122

Id.
Id.

Id.
See id. at 2641 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined in his
dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
125 Id. at 2641-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 2642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123
124

128

Id.

Id.
Id. at 2643-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that in both
Orozco and Innis, the Court had insisted that, during custodial interrogation, police
officers inform suspects of their rights before eliciting answers concerning the location of incriminating weapons. Id. at 2643 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the holdings of Orozco and Innis, see supra notes 79-90 and accompanying
text.
129
130
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police and prosecutors with specificity" as to the procedures they
had to follow when interrogating defendants in custody, as well
as the virtue of providing courts with a test for determining admissibility of self-incriminating statements. 13' Justice Marshall argued that the majority's "chimerical quest for public safety" not
only would end "eighteen years of doctrinal tranquility [in] the
field of custodial interrogations," but would also result in
32
chaos. 1
The dissent expressed doubt that police officers could "instinctively" distinguish between questions designed to protect
the public safety and questions designed to preserve testimonial
evidence. 1 33 Justice Marshall cautioned that the public safety exception would inevitably lead to uncertainty and mistakes in its
application. 1 34 Thus, he postulated that law enforcement agencies would again
have to endure a "period of constitutional
13 5
uncertainty."'
Justice Marshall asserted, however, that the greatest flaw in
the majority's opinion was its misunderstanding of Miranda's implementation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 13 He posited that the majority, in reaching its
conclusion, had "turn[ed] its back on these constitutional considerations, and invit[ed] the government to prosecute through the
use of what necessarily are coerced statements."' 137 In the dissent's view, the Court had incorrectly perceived Miranda as a judicial balance between the protections afforded criminal
defendants by the fifth amendment and "the cost to society in
terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects."' 138 Asserting that
the fifth amendment restrictions are absolute, Justice Marshall
opined that the majority should not be able to circumvent them
"simply by calculating special costs . . .when the public's safety
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. To support its position, the dissent noted the opposite conclusions
reached by both the New York Court of Appeals and the majority of the Supreme
Court after reviewing the same set of facts in Quarles. Id. The New York Court of
Appeals had concluded " 'that there was no evidence in the record ... that there
were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety.' " Id. (citation omitted). In contrast, the majority in the Supreme Court found that "[slo long as the
gun was concealed somewhere . . .with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety." Id. (quoting id. at 2632).
133 See id.at 2644 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 2645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
13

132
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is at issue."' 139
The dissent further chastised the Court for ignoring the presumption of compulsion that was raised in Miranda.140 He asserted that under Miranda, any statements made by a defendant
during custodial interrogation, prior to the recital of the required
warnings, are presumptively compelled. 14 ' Maintaining that exigent circumstances make custodial interrogation no less compelling, Justice Marshall would therefore have excluded Quarles's
statement from evidence at trial.' 4 2
In creating the public safety exception, the Quarles Court has
significantly retreated from the fundamental principles that
guided Chief Justice Warren when he wrote the Miranda opinion
eighteen years ago. According to the Miranda Court, the fifth
amendment privilege is "fundamental to our system of constitutional rule"' 4 ' and cannot be "abridged."' 144 The Miranda Court
believed that society's need for convictions of guilty defendants
must be subordinate to an individual's privilege against self-incrimination, 14 5 and it established objective procedural safeguards
14 6
to protect diligently that privilege.
In creating the now famous warnings, the Miranda Court emphasized the need to protect the rights of individuals from the
often pernicious and unscrupulous methods employed by police
officers in eliciting testimonial evidence. 14 7 Because the Miranda
Court recognized that it is impossible to measure objectively the
inherent psychological coercion that is exerted upon a defendant
139 Id. at 2648 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
i40 Id. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244,

4258 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Elstad rejects Quarles Court's
assertion that confessions obtained in violation of Miranda are not presumed
compelled).
141 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also maintained
that questions asked in exigent circumstances are no less coercive than any other
kinds of questions asked in custodial situations. Id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, in her view, answers elicited in
violation of Miranda must be presumed compelled and be excluded from evidence
at a defendant's trial. Id.
143 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
144 Id. at 479.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 444-45, 467.
147 See id. at 445-58. The Miranda Court referred at length to police manuals,
which instructed officers in interrogation techniques that were designed to psychologically coerce suspects to confess. Id. For representative examples of these techniques, see id.
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during custodial interrogation, 48 it created a constitutional presumption of coercion. 49 That presumption is triggered when
statements are elicited in the absence of specific, pre-interrogation warnings.' 5 0
The Quarles majority has weakened the constitutional presumption by maintaining that under circumstances posing a
threat to public safety the Court will not presume coercion, even
absent a recital of the Miranda warnings. 5 ' Thus, rather than
placing the cost of securing the public safety upon the state, the
Quarles Court has departed from the philosophical underpinnings
of Miranda and has for the first time imposed upon a defendant
the burden of proving affirmatively
that his statements were
52
prompted by actual compulsion.

The ramifications of the Court's public safety exception are
far-reaching. In departing from the presumption enunciated in
Miranda, the Quarles Court has created several unresolved ambiguities. Because Quarles asserted no claim of actual compulsion,
the Court declined to review whether his testimony was coerced
merely because Miranda warnings had not been given. 153 Under a
broad reading of Quarles, compelled testimony could now be admissible in evidence. The Court did indicate, however, that
proof of actual coercion would warrant suppression of self-incriminating statements, even if5those
statements were elicited in
4
"public safety" interrogations.

The Court's requirement of a showing of "actual coercion"
is particularly troublesome because the Court failed to provide a
functional definition. Clearly, a showing of physical coercion will
meet the burden. 55 The Court, however, historically has been
unable to define objective standards to measure psychological
148

See id. at 467.

See id. at 468-69. This presumption of coercion was recognized in each of the
Quarles opinions. See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631; id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150 See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631; id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at 2631 n.5.
152 See id. The Court stated that Quarles "is certainly free on remand to argue
that his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards." Id. It
should be noted that the "traditional due process standards" referred to by the
Court is equivalent to the voluntariness test historically applied in pre-Miranda
cases. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
153 Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5.
154 See id. at 2631, 2633 n.7.
155 Police brutality has long been condemned by the Supreme Court. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-48.
149
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coercion. 56 Consequently, courts will be faced with the task of
discerning the subtleties of interrogation practices and of reviewing the facts of each custodial interrogation to determine
whether the defendant has been psychologically coerced. Such
inquiries inevitably will lead to "swearing contests" between police officers and defendants 57 and will result in conflicting findings by courts reviewing the same sets of facts.' 58 Therefore, the
Quarles decision will likely result in increased litigation, which will
be time-consuming and costly to the judicial system, as well as
disruptive to law enforcement practice. It can be anticipated that
the end result will be the creation, by subsequent courts, of a
detailed set of guidelines, incorporating even more exceptions
and subtle distinctions.
Although the Quarles Court conceded that the subjective
state of mind of police officers acting in "kaleidoscopic" situations is impossible to verify,' 5 9 it ignored the Miranda Court's
60
premise that a defendant's state of mind is also unverifiable.
Because coercion will not be presumed under the public safety
exception, the defendant now faces a difficult burden of proving
subjective coercion.
The public safety exception is predicated upon the Quarles
majority's belief in the honesty and good faith of police officers
conducting custodial interrogation in situations that pose a
threat of danger to the public. As the Court conceded, however,
one of the "unverifiable motives" that may prompt a police officer to interrogate a suspect before administering the Miranda
warnings may be "the desire to obtain incriminating evidence."' 6' The Court's refusal both to examine the motives of
police officers and to delineate interrogation guidelines to be
used under such circumstances opens the door to unbridled police discretion and places a premium on police ingenuity.
156 See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2646 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157 See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 269.
158 The Quarles decision exemplifies the problems that courts will encounter in
future "public safety" exception cases. A divided court in Quarles reached opposite

conclusions as to whether Quarles was actually coerced. While the majority's decision indicated that there was no actual coercion, the dissent found that such coercion did in fact occur. See Quarks, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 & n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159 See id. at 2632.
160 Cf.Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69 ("[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual
cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to
his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more
than speculation.
...
).
161 Quarles, 104 S.Ct. at 2632.
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In disminishing the clarity of the Miranda rule, the Court
may have opened a "Pandora's box," leading to the erosion of
"absolute" constitutional rights that are protected by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In Berkemer v.
McCarty,'6 ' which was decided three weeks after Quarles, the petitioner, a police sheriff, asked the Supreme Court to carve another
exception out of Miranda.163 The Court, in refusing to recognize
a new exception, held that individuals who are subject to custodial interrogation are "entitled to the full panoply of protections
prescribed by Miranda," irrespective "of the nature or severity of
the offense."' 16 4 More recently, however, the Court in Oregon v.
Elstad,165 further weakened Miranda by holding that statements
elicited from a suspect after an initial violation of the Miranda
rule are admissible at trial if the subsequent statements are given
voluntarily.' 66 Thus, it is likely that in light of Quarles additional
exceptions to the Miranda rule will emerge.
Finally, the Quarles opinion fails to recognize that testimony
acquired during custodial interrogations, without Miranda protections, may be inherently untrustworthy. The Court's acceptance of testimony under the public safety exception without
reviewing its voluntariness may cause a defendant falsely to accuse himself. 167 Failure to review the reliability of self-incriminating statements may culminate in the admission of evidence that is
prohibited under the fifth amendment privilege. Therefore, the
Court should place upon the state the burden of proving that any
testimony obtained under the public safety exception is reliable
and trustworthy before admitting it into evidence.
To mitigate some of the problems and ambiguities created
by the public safety exception, subsequent reviewing courts will
invariably attempt to create guidelines and procedures. It can be
expected that those courts will identify objective standards in order to help law enforcement agencies implement the new exception. In addition, courts may find it necessary to revive the preMiranda voluntariness test in order to retain some protection
104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).
Id. at 3145. The petitioner argued that answers that were elicited in the absence of Miranda warnings from individuals arrested for misdemeanor traffic offenses should be admissible in evidence. Id.
164 Id. at 3148, 3151.
165 53 U.S.L.W. 4244 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985).
166 See id. at 4250.
167 Cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 n.24 ("Interrogation procedures may . . .give
rise to a false confession.").
162
163
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against compelled testimony. Although the voluntariness test
may be fraught with the same inherent difficulties that plagued it
prior to Miranda,'6 8 it may be necessary to support use of the test
in the limited context of the public safety exception.
The public safety exception effectively reinstates the imbalance between police officer and suspect that existed prior to the
creation of the Miranda warnings. Therefore, if the rationale for
developing prophylactic rules that protect the fifth amendment
privilege is to be respected, police should not be permitted to
interrogate suspects under any circumstances before the appropriate
warnings are given.
Howard K Uniman
168

See supra note 45.

